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 The aim of this paper is to set out some features of Kant’s conception of transcendental 
philosophy. I would like to argue that this philosophy, although it is situated at a higher level of 
discourse than common knowledge, does not essentially transcend the limits that it sets to this 
knowledge. In order to achieve this, I stress the fact that Kant regards experience as a mere 
“possibility.”  Now, the Critique of Pure Reason explains that the human understanding cannot 
conceive of an absolute possibility, but only a relative one, namely a possibility that is tied to 
conditions.  And possible experience as a whole is no exception here.  Hence the expression 
“conditions of the possibility of experience” which designates the topic of the Transcendental 
Analytic.  This also means that experience is “contingent” (A 737/B 765).  It is not in itself 
necessary; rather, it is dependent upon certain conditions. But then we learn that the most 
important transcendental conditions for this experience, i.e., the dynamic principles, are 
themselves “contingent” (A 160/B 199).  Consequently, these transcendental conditions are not 








In what follows, I would like to bring out some features of Kant’s conception of 
transcendental philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason. One of the aims of this work was to 
answer the question raised in the famous letter to Markus Herz of February 21st, 1772, about the 
possibility of a priori knowledge’s relating to its object.1 And as we know, the answer elaborated 
in the Critique restricts the use of this pure knowledge to possible experience. Knowledge a 
priori is valid only when applied to appearances, within experience.  It is therefore a finite 
knowledge, limited to the phenomenal world. 
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Now the question is: What is the legitimacy of Kant’s own transcendental discourse when 
we take account of the restrictions imposed on human knowledge as a result of this very 
investigation? In other words, the use of a priori knowledge being restricted to possible 
experience, how could the knowledge claim of this philosophical enquiry be justified if it does 
not itself take place within possible experience? The problem already becomes obvious with the 
formulation of the main result of the critical investigation, namely that the only valid sphere for a 
priori knowledge is “possible experience.” Yet how are we to understand the use of the word 
“possible” here? To be sure, possibility is a modal category whose conditions of legitimate 
application are strictly determined and restricted in the transcendental Analytic. And the same 
goes for the category of contingency, which, as we will see, plays an important role in specifying 
the status of the conditions of the possibility of experience.  But then again the question is: Does 
Kant make an inappropriate or illegitimate use of these categories when, rather than applying 
them to objects of a possible experience, he uses them to describe the scope of valid a priori 
knowledge as a whole? By apparently removing the restrictions on their use here, it seems as 
though Kant is making a transcendent or, as he would say, “transcendental,” employment of the 
categories of modality. 
I will argue, however, that this use of the categories complies, all things considered, with 
the constraints imposed upon them for their application in experience. We will find that the 
categories at work in Kant’s transcendental discourse are not employed without caution in their 
purely intellectual significance, which would lead them to open unto the unconditioned, as in the 
Transcendental Dialectic. On the contrary, the standpoint from which critical philosophy 
condemns every attempt to gain knowledge of the unconditioned is not itself unconditioned. I 
would like to show that transcendental philosophy, even when it circumscribes the limits of 
human knowledge with the help of the modal categories of possibility and contingency, 
nevertheless remains finite and refrains from overstepping the “bounds of sense.” In order to 
achieve this, we will have to pay attention and define carefully Kantian expressions found in the 
first Critique such as “possible experience,” “transcendental knowledge,” “conditions of the 
possibility,” and “contingency” which in the end will lead us to establish the modal status of the 





 Before we inquire into the role played by possible experience in the transcendental 
philosophy developed in the first Critique, we would be well advised to focus on the meaning of 
each of these words. “Experience” is a well-known Kantian term designating the knowledge of 
objects that are “given in empirical intuition” or, if one prefers, the “knowledge of the objects 
through perception.” The short definition is thus “empirical knowledge,”2 whereby it is 
understood that this knowledge lays claim to objectivity. Experience is in fact objective empirical 
knowledge. 
 “Possibility” is a modal category which, from a strictly logical point of view, refers to that 
which does not contradict itself. To say that a concept is “possible” simply means that its internal 
components are not in contradiction with each other. This is what Baumgarten in his Metaphysica 
calls “absolute” possibility3 – a characterization for which he is criticized in Kant’s lectures on 
metaphysics as well as (though implicitly) in the Transcendental Dialectic.4 In fact, Baumgarten 
uses the adjective “absolute” to designate “intrinsic” possibility, which according to Kant is the 
“least” that can be said of the concept of an object.  But the strong meaning of the word should be 
maintained. In Kant’s view, absolute possibility properly signifies the “most” that can be said of a 
concept, namely that its object is possible literally “in all respects” and “without any restriction” 
whatsoever.5  
 Kant feels the need to restore the strong sense of the term “absolute” at the beginning of 
the Transcendental Dialectic because it is synonymous with “unconditioned,” which is the main 
topic of this second part of the Critique devoted to the logic of illusion. Indeed, a possibility that 
is absolute in the full sense of the word pertains not to the understanding but to reason,6 and this 
category gives rise to the same problem as the modal concept of “unconditioned necessity” used 
by the dogmatic metaphysician in the cosmological proof of the existence of God. That is, both 
concepts exceed the grasp of the human mind: “The unconditioned necessity, which we need so 
indispensably as the ultimate sustainer of all things, is for human reason the true abyss.”7 The 
treatment reserved for the modal categories in the Transcendental Analytic reveals that only 
“hypothetical” necessity, that is, conditioned necessity, is available to human cognition, and the 
same goes for possibility, as we learn in Reflexion 4005: “With reason we can cognize only 
conditioned possibility.”8 The only kind of possibility that can be grasped by a finite 
unederstanding is relative possibility, namely that which is possible only in some respects. 
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Accordingly, possibility is cognizable only if it is “restricted to conditions.”9 Let us take for 
instance Kant’s example of the “invented concepts” of substances and forces supposedly present 
in experience.  It is not enough to say that such concepts are possible because they are not self-
contradictory.  To be sure, this satisfies the minimal requirement of their logical possibility, but 
their real possibility also has to be established within experience by showing that these objects 
can be instantiated according to its known laws.10 This is a clear example of conditioned 
possibility.  
 Now when Kant considers possible experience as a whole, rather than just particular 
objects within it, he maintains a similar restriction on his recourse to the concept of possibility. 
Experience might well be declared “possible,” but here again only as a conditioned possibility. 
Hence the central expression for the Critique of Pure Reason: “conditions of the possibility of 
experience.”11 Experience taken globally will thus be possible solely under a set of conditions. As 
we can see, Kant remains coherent in his use of the category of possibility: experience’s 
possibility also depends on conditions, and most importantly on transcendental conditions. We 
will have to enquire into the nature of this transcendental conditioning, but before going any 
further we must again focus our attention on Kant’s terminology. 
 
Transcendental knowledge 
 Let us quote the canonical definition of the term “transcendental” given in the second 
edition of the Introduction of the Critique: “I call transcendental all knowledge that is occupied 
not so much with objects but rather with our mode of knowledge of objects insofar as this mode 
of knowledge is to be possible a priori.”12 Here we clearly have two levels of  knowledge: a first 
level concerned with the knowledge of objects and a second level dealing with our mode of 
knowledge a priori of these objects, which is precisely what transcendental knowledge is about. 
This means that in the Transcendental Analytic Kant is concerned primarily with a priori 
knowledge, or better: with our a priori mode of knowledge of objects.   
 However, all a priori knowledge is subject to a constraint: it can never reach the object in 
its actuality. For this, according to the teachings of the transcendental Analytic, the empirical 
dimension of the object must be added, at which point the knowledge becomes a posteriori. As 
we can read in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, “[t]o know something a priori 
means to know it in its mere possibility.”13 Transcendental knowledge is no exception here, and 
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so it is no surprise that it is oriented exclusively toward “possible” experience.14 The a priori 
knowledge introduced in the Transcendental Analytic is aimed at grounding the mere possibility 
of experience, and for this purpose it has to “abstract from everything empirical in the 
appearances.”15 
 Furthermore, it must be noted that knowledge of the a priori conditions of experience is 
not just any kind of a priori knowledge. It is, as I already said, a second-level knowledge. Its 
distinctive nature will become clear if we compare it with first-level kind of a priori knowledge 
such as pure geometry. While geometry is focused exclusively on its objects, which are merely 
ideal, the a priori conditions of experience on the other hand concern our mode of knowledge of 
real objects insofar as it presents their a priori components. It is nonetheless a form of 
‘knowledge’, with its own truth claim – not empirical, to be sure, but transcendental. And since, 
for Kant, truth means adaequatio, that is, the correspondence of knowledge with its correlate,16 
transcendental truth also involves such a correlate: possible experience. 
 In order to establish this correlation we can mention the two passages in the Analytic 
dealing with this specific truth claim. The first one appears, as we know, in the Schematism 
chapter: “…transcendental truth, which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible, 
consists in the general relation to this [the entirety of all possible experience, C.P.].”17 The 
schemata are those products of the imagination that allow the pure concepts of the understanding 
to connect with possible experience. These a priori concepts thereby acquire their truth, that is, 
their objective validity, since from then on they have a correlate that can ground their claim to 
transcendental truth. The second passage is to be found in the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, 
to which we will come back later on. It concerns the categories of relation, which gain their 
objective validity by their mere reference to experience in general: “…one cognize[s] their 
objective reality [of the categories of relation, C.P.], i.e., their transcendental truth, and, to be 
sure, independently of experience, but yet not independently of all relation to the form of an 
experience in general...”18 On the one hand, the transcendental principles laid out in the Analytic 
acquire their truth through their relation to possible experience; on the other hand, experience 
owes its own possibility to these a priori conditions.  ‘Possible experience’ thus has a twofold 
meaning: 1) experience is made possible by a priori conditions; and 2) possible experience 
confers validity on the entire transcendental apparatus.19  
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 This correlation is difficult to grasp since it takes place at a virtual level; it has no 
anchorage point, so to speak. If the correlate of the a priori conditions of experience were a given 
object to which such knowledge could correspond, the reader of the Critique of Pure Reason 
would have a much easier task. But as we have seen, this correlate is a mere possibility. There is 
no actual object nor any well secured knowledge to rely on. It goes without saying that Kant is 
fully aware of this situation, which is bound up with his way of proceeding in the Critique, as he 
will himself later admit in the Prolegomena. The Critique does not presuppose any “fact” 
whatsoever.20  The only thing that is given is reason as a faculty of cognition, which contains 
(together with the pure forms of intuition) the a priori elements that make all knowledge, and 
indeed all objects of knowledge, possible. Beginning with those a priori elements, the first 
Critique adopts a synthetic and progressive procedure that leads to the possibility of experience.  
In contrast, the Prolegomena of 1783 offer a more accessible presentation of transcendental 
philosophy beginning from two sciences, pure mathematics and pure natural science, both of 
which are already firmly established and aptly combined in Newtonian physics. A regressive 
analysis – from the given to its presuppositions -- of these pure sciences thus allows a much 
easier access to their a priori conditions of possibility.   
 As a reminder, we may quote a passage from the Transcendental Methodology which 
highlights the difficulty of proving a transcendental principle when the regressive procedure is 
excluded, as it is the case in the first Critique. What I have in mind is the end of the chapter on 
the Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use, where Kant writes that the principle of causality 
can be proven apodictically, but only with regard to the experience that is thereby made possible. 
The proof therefore cannot take experience for granted and rely on it as a point of reference, since 
experience is first made possible by this very principle: “it [the principle of causality] has the 
special property that it first makes possible its ground of proof, namely experience, and must 
always be presupposed in this [experience].”21 
 
The a priori conditions of possible experience 
 Among the conditions of experience, Kant distinguishes the conditions of the possibility 
of experience from the conditions of its actuality. The first are a priori and manifestly receive the 
most attention in the Critique since they are specifically transcendental, while the others are a 
posteriori, that is, empirical.  To be sure, together they constitute what makes experience 
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‘possible’, yet, in the narrow sense, it is the a priori conditions that are especially concerned with 
the “possibility” of experience.   
 The entire set of conditions for experience, namely the conditions of the possibility, of the 
actuality and of the necessity of an appearance, are laid out systematically in the three Postulates 
of Empirical Thinking in General: 
1- Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with 
intuition and concepts) is possible. 
2- That which is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation) is 
actual. 
3- That whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with the general 
conditions of experience is (exists) necessarily.22  
 
As we can see, the first postulate concerns the formal aspect of experience, the second its matter, 
i.e., “sensation” which is for Kant “the sole characteristic of actuality,”23 whereas the third, which 
deals with an “existence” that is at the same time recognized as necessary, is simply a 
combination of the first two Postulates.24 In this third case we can think of Kant’s famous 
example, “the sun warms the stone.” The actuality of the warmth of the stone (known through 
sensation) is necessary because it is the effect of the sun’s rays.  
 To be sure, the first Postulate has to do with the conditions that make an “object” (Ding, 
Gegenstand)25 possible, but since the transcendental deduction shows that experience and its 
objects share the same conditions of possibility,26 the “formal” conditions in the first Postulate 
are clearly the a priori conditions of possible experience in general. In other words, while the 
second Postulate deals with the empirical conditions of experience, the first introduces its 
transcendental conditions, namely the pure forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the 
understanding. These a priori elements are the starting-point of the Deduction, which endeavors 
to demonstrate the validity of these a priori formal conditions.27 It goes without saying that these 
intuitive and conceptual elements are combined in the eight principles presented in the 
Transcendental Analytic. The principles show the interaction of these elements that, as a priori 
synthetic propositions, embody the formal conditions of the possibility of experience.  Let us note 
that experience does not have to be actual at this stage since these transcendental propositions 
acquire their objective validity simply by making experience possible. 
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 Now in order to illustrate the finite character of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, we 
must consider more closely the nature of these transcendental conditions of experience. As we 
know Kant divides his table of the principles of the understanding under two headings: 
mathematical and dynamical. Of these two classes, it is the dynamical principles that are the most 
relevant to my purpose here, but their special status can best be explained by first establishing a 
contrast with the mathematical principles, namely the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations 
of Perception. Obviously, these principles do not themselves belong to mathematics, yet they 
deserve this name insofar as they authorize the full application of the results of mathematics to 
experience. The reason for this is simple, but it might nevertheless be reminded: the synthesis of 
apprehension of the manifold in experience is, according to the Axioms of Intuition, the “same 
synthesis”28 as the one at work in the quantitative synthesis of the homogenous units of pure 
intuition in mathematics. This means that all the operations of quantification made a priori in 
arithmetic and in Euclidian geometry are automatically and universally applicable to experience 
so that their objective validity is guaranteed from the start. It thus comes as no surprise when 
Kant argues that these principles are “constitutive” of the objects of experience as far as their 
intuition is concerned. The quantification of extensive as well as of intensive magnitudes can be 
fully anticipated; for example, everything that geometry says about space as a formal intuition is 
by the same token valid for concrete experience. This is also what Kant has in mind when, 
speaking of intensive magnitude, he writes that the luminosity of the sun can be calculated a 
priori. To be sure, the sun and its light are not known a priori, but the calculus as such allows one 
to “construct” this magnitude “a priori.”29 
 It is obvious that all the principles of the Transcendental Analytic are ‘necessary’ 
conditions of the possibility of experience, but the mathematical principles are further declared 
“necessary” in their very exercise (Ausübung): their evidence is intuitive and they are a priori 
constitutive of the object of experience itself, at least as far as its anticipated magnitude is 
concerned.30 On the other hand, the application of the dynamical principles, that is, the Analogies 
of Experience and the Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General, are said to be merely 
“contingent” in the sense that even though these principles anticipate experience, their exercise is 
“indirect” and “mediated.”31 The reason for this distinction is that the latter principles are 
concerned not so much with the mere intuition of the object as with its existence. And existence 
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cannot be constructed a priori; it must first manifest itself empirically in order to be regulated by 
the dynamical principles.   
 Consider the dynamical principle of causality. According to this principle, once an 
appearance has presented itself through a sensation (for instance, a stone that becomes warm), 
this event can only be interpreted as an effect whose cause must be sought in a preceding moment 
in time, such as the emission of sunrays, for example. The difference between mathematical and 
dynamical principles can best be illustrated by Kant’s distinction between mathematical and 
philosophical (dynamical) types of “analogy.”32 A mathematical analogy deals solely with 
quantitative relations, so that if three terms of an equation are given then the fourth can be found 
a priori and determined with precision. In contrast, a dynamical analogy concerns the qualitative 
(typically causal) relations between objects with respect to their existence. First, the fourth term 
is “given” (for example, the warm stone), and then the principle only provides a rule to inquire 
about the third term, without allowing us to anticipate a priori what this third element will be.33 
This givenness of the event which escapes the control of the knowing subject is what leads Kant 
to claim that the exercise of these dynamic principles is merely “contingent”: “The a priori 
conditions … of the existence of the objects of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves 
only contingent.”34 This comes somewhat as a surprise because it seems to weaken the status of 
the dynamical principles, which are central for the possibility of experience. Not only is the 
principle of causality the one that reoccurs most of the time when Kant seeks to illustrate the role 
of the transcendental principles, but we also know, thanks to Paul Guyer,35 that in the 
Duisburg’sche Nachlass the Analogies of experience, then called the “analogies of appearance,” 
were at the center of Kant’s early efforts to establish the conditions of the possibility of 
experience, whereas the mathematical principles seem to have been added only to the later 
versions of the table of the Analytic in view of the publication of the Critique. Now the question 
is: What is so particular about the dynamical principles that warrants their being reduced to the 
status of mere contingency? 
 
The contingency of some of the a priori conditions of experience      
    We are facing a problem similar to the one we encountered concerning the concept of 
possibility. Like the latter, contingency belongs to the categories of modality, here as the 
counterpart of the concept of necessity. Yet the nominal definition of contingency does not reveal 
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much, and so beyond the ‘logical’ meaning of the word we have to search for some ‘real’ 
meaning. The logical definition of contingency simply refers to something whose non-being does 
not imply contradiction.36 For a more telling definition, for ‘real’ definition, we must turn to the 
way Kant applies it within experience. The details of this use are spelled out in the General Note 
on the System of the Principles added to the second edition of the Critique.37 There we learn that 
contingency as a category of modality can only be understood if it is linked with another set of 
categories, namely the categories of relation. Indeed, contingency is for human knowledge 
essentially a ‘relational’ concept. It must be related to something else because otherwise we 
would be left with an “absolute contingency,” which according to Kant is too “big” a concept for 
us.38 This coincides with our earlier findings about the absolute possibility: it is the “most” that 
can be said on the possibility of a concept and as such a finite mind cannot understand what it 
means. Let us recall that Kant refrains from deciding if, for example, substance in experience is 
in itself contingent or necessary – we simply cannot know since such a knowledge would call for 
a speculative use of reason.39 Contingency then applies only to the accidents of appearances, 
since they can be interrelated. Kant gives the case of a body that was first in movement and has 
come to rest. As such, the mere change from movement to rest proves neither the contingency of 
this resting state nor of the movement observed earlier: these contrary states of the body occur at 
different times. To claim that the initial movement is contingent, we have to admit that at that 
initial time the body could just as well have been at rest. Yet this can only be made 
comprehensible to our finite knowledge if we presuppose that the reason why the body was in 
motion, rather than at rest, is that this motion results from some cause. And this is what Kant has 
in mind when he claims that contingency is comprehensible solely with the help of the categories 
of relation, in particular cause-and-effect: the movement of the body is a contingent state 
because, without the action of a cause, the body would have initially been at rest. Contingency is 
intrinsically linked with the concept of cause.40 
 Can we now apply this reading, valid within the field of experience, to our prior question 
about the contingency of the transcendental principles that Kant calls dynamical? To be sure, the 
relation to be established here cannot be to a physical ‘cause’ as in the example above. But it 
should at least take the form of a “condition,” to use a more neutral term. If the Analogies of 
Experience are contingent in their application, this means that, as a priori conditions of 
experience, they are themselves ‘conditioned’.41 And this is exactly what Kant claims in the 
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passage where he declares these principles to be contingent: “…the principles of the dynamical 
use, to be sure, also carry with them the character of an a priori necessity, but only under the 
condition of empirical thinking in an experience, thus only mediately and indirectly.”42 While the 
mathematical principles could precede the material conditions of experience, pertaining as they 
do only to the form of intuition or to the intensive magnitude of its matter, the dynamical 
principles on the other hand are in an essential manner related to the “empirical” conditions. This 
holds for the Analogies as well as for the Postulates of ‘Empirical’ Thinking. They are 
conditioned by perception, because they are tied to the givenness of the object. This was already 
clear in the sentence quoted above on the contingency of these principles: they deal with the 
“existence of the objects of a possible empirical intuition.” Intuition here is not formal but clearly 
“empirical.” This empirical conditioning does not have to be actual though; it merely has to be 
“possible.” 
 The following conclusion can be drawn from the contingent character of the dynamical 
principles: among the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience there are some, indeed 
the most important ones, that are themselves conditioned. And this result does indeed conform 
with the ‘real’ meaning of contingency according to Kant: “All contingency is only possible in a 
conditioned manner.”43 This plainly amounts to saying that the transcendental point of view in 
the Critique is not absolute, but relative.  Being contingent in their application, the dynamic 
principles are dependent upon something else: the material (empirical) conditions. 
 Naturally both the formal and the material conditions are combined for the production of 
experience, but it is important to specify the terms of this joint contribution. In his lectures on 
metaphysics, Kant deals repeatedly with the question of multiple causes contributing to a single 
effect (in our case: experience). He calls them concaussae (or Mitursachen) and suggests that 
there are two ways for them to bring about their effect: Either they run parallel and remain merely 
coordinated, or they are subordinated.44 If we apply this model to the transcendental production 
of experience, we are compelled to conclude, after what we have seen, that the dynamical 
principles are subordinated to the possibility of the material conditions, at least if they are to be a 
priori cognitions at all. These a priori synthetic propositions are conditioned cognitions, which 
can in no way lay claim to the status of the unconditioned and which therefore do not have to be 
implemented by an absolute subject. 
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What is said – and what can be said – of the transcendental subject is restricted to its role 
in the constitution of experience. The spontaneity of the understanding, which culminates in the 
unity of apperception, is known only through the way it “affects” inner sense. In this case inner 
sense contains the reflection of this activity, which consists essentially in combining 
representations.45 The empirical representations are at first present in their merely subjective 
order, and the role of the understanding through its spontaneity is to introduce an objective order 
among them. For example, if the perception of the warm stone comes first and then afterward the 
perception of the rays of the sun, it would be erroneous to claim, in accordance with the 
subjective temporal succession, that the first perception is the cause of the second and to say that 
the warm stone has produced the hot sunrays. The understanding simply restores the objective 
order of things. 
 But the thinking subject thereby runs up against the limits of its spontaneity. Such an 
activity is limited to the combination of the representations in inner sense. The spontaneity of the 
understanding does not however produce the manifold of these representations, since it would 
then be an intuitive understanding.  If Kant’s transcendental investigation aims at establishing the 
limits of human knowledge, these limits must also be recognized within the transcendental 
apparatus: “That understanding through whose self-consciousness the manifold of intuition 
would at the same time be given, an understanding through whose representation the objects… 
would at the same time exist, would not require a special act of the synthesis of the manifold for 
the unity of consciousness, which the human understanding, which merely thinks, but does not 
intuit, does require.”46 In other words, an understanding that would directly intuit the existence of 
its object would not be conditioned. It would be totally independent and self-sufficient. It would 
produce its object of knowledge without any further condition, that is, without external 
conditions. 
 We have seen that the material conditions are precisely what show the limits of the a 
priori conditions of experience. If, on the one hand, inner sense can be affected ‘from within’ by 
the spontaneity of the understanding, it can also be affected ‘from without’, via outer sense, by 
perception, which represents a radical type of otherness vis-à-vis the transcendental subject.47 
Kant sometimes calls it the “transcendental object,” but it is best known as the notorious “thing in 
itself.”  This is the sphere where the passivity of the subject begins, where receptivity takes on its 
full significance. 
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 I know all too well that the thing in itself is a hotly disputed topic, but I simply want to 
stress that Kant’s positing of the thing in itself does not represent a leap into the unconditioned. 
On the contrary, the thing in itself is the ultimate recognition of the conditioned character of the 
knowing subject and of her knowledge. This second kind of affection of inner sense (via outer 
sense) cannot be attributed merely to the appearances, nor can it be regarded as a mere epistemic 
requirement, that is, an object of thought. It is an ontological statement that is constitutive of 
Kant’s investigation of the limits of human knowledge. As Karl Ameriks has argued, there has to 
be a legitimate place for “transcendental affection” in Kant.48 For instance, Kant is aware that the 
“I think” of the transcendental deduction contains an existential statement although he refrains 
from exploiting it in a Cartesian fashion and cautions that nothing can be known about the nature 
of the transcendental subject. The Dialectic will remind us that it is even impossible to say that it 
is a substance.49 It is nevertheless admitted as existing. Now it should be possible to say the same 
of the counterpart of the transcendental subject: the thing in itself. Nothing can be known of its 
nature, but its specific kind of affection of sensibility is nonetheless essential for the general 
possibility of experience.50 
 
Conclusion 
 We raised the question of whether it was legitimate for Kant’s transcendental discourse to 
use certain modal categories beyond the realm of empirical knowledge (experience), that is, 
outside of the only type of knowledge in which a priori synthetic propositions have access to 
intuition, formal as well as material. To this question we might answer that the modal categories 
in Kant’s transcendental discourse are ultimately focused on experience itself as a whole. In my 
view, this reference to possible empirical knowledge is precisely what justifies the use of these 
modal categories and what confers upon them a claim to truth in Kant’s transcendental discourse, 
although, to be sure, this claim to objective reality is indirect. We are far from the typically 
“transcendental” use of the categories in the Dialectic.  After all, experience in not an absolute 
possibility, much less an unconditioned necessity, like the dialectical idea of God, for example. 
We are rather led to conclude with Kant that possible experience is in the end something “entirely 
contingent,”51 since it depends on a broad set of conditions.  And we furthermore discovered that 
the most important among these transcendental conditions are themselves contingent in turn. 
Unlike freedom, say, which is construed in the thesis of the third Antinomy as an absolute 
	 14	
causality, they are not unconditioned conditions. Finally, the focal point of the transcendental 
conceptual conditions, the ‘I think’, is not declared in the Analytic to be a noumenal substance, 
which is what the dialectical reasoning in the Paralogism of Pure Reason tries to establish. On the 
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